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ISSUES IN EXTRATERRITORIALITY
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GANN*

The American Law Institute adopted the Restatement (Revised) of
Foreign Relations a year ago from the time of this writing.' And as this
publication goes to press, the Restatement too is being published. It is quite
appropriate that this symposium on the topic of extraterritoriality appears
coincidentally with the Restatement's publication, since much of the
discussion of this topic over the last several years occurred in the context of
2
the Restatement's preparation.
Because many pages have already been written about this topic, 3 one may
ask why another symposium on extraterritoriality ought to be published. The
answer appears in the writings in this symposium and in the nature of
international law itself. In the absence of international written agreements,
the international law principles ofjurisdiction must be established as a matter
of customary international law under the usual tests of state practice. Little
treaty law exists to delimit state jurisdiction; some state practice exists, but
much of it suggests disagreement, sometimes quite contentious, rather than
strong consensus. In this context, many of the black-letter jurisdictional rules
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of the revised Restatement must be viewed as both tentative and subject to
evolution by subsequent state practice. This fact is evidenced in the language
4
of the rules themselves, much of which leaves them open-ended and flexible.
These rules, then, may (and ought to) be continually revisited both at the
theoretical and methodological level and at the level of their application to
specific economic regulatory areas, such as antitrust and export controls, in an

attempt to enlighten state practice. Also, under such a potentially chaotic
situation, attention must be given to pragmatic management of
extraterritoriality issues by governments. The articles in this symposium
address the topic of extraterritoriality on these various levels: theory and
methodology, application to specific economic regulatory laws, and
management of state practice.
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Professor Brilmayer's methodological writing 5 compares and contrasts

problems under American conflict of laws and under extraterritorial
application of American laws. She first notes the difference in application of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and the Restatement (Revised)
of Foreign Relations Law. American conflict of laws deals with conflicts
between the law of a state of the United States and that of another state or
nation. Conflict of jurisdiction under foreign relations law concerns conflicts
between American federal law and the law of another nation. She notes two
similar methodological problems under both subjects: (1) domestic choice of
law and international conflict of jurisdiction typically involve interpretations
of policies and interests underlying a statute that does not itself address the
choice or conflict (she refers to this as the silent statute problem); and (2) the
competing claims underlying the choice or conflict are based on the laws of
another jurisdiction (she refers to this as the narrow nationalism problem), so
the court must determine to what extent, if any, the competing claims of the
other jurisdiction ought to be taken into account. Both problems, she notes,
pose exceptional difficulties for the judiciary. She attributes much of the
extraterritoriality problem to the fact that judges are interpreting silent
statutes according to what they think the legislature would have wanted had it
thought about the specific question, and then applying principles of policy,
justice, or international law. Once construed, however, it is harder to adjust
the "statutory" interpretation than it is for judges to adjust, for example, the
common law. Also, in construing statutes, the range of foreign interests that
the judiciary deems itself capable of taking into account is much narrower
than the interests the legislature might very well think important. In the last
part of her article, Professor Brilmayer discusses why the American
Constitution has played a significant role in domestic conflict of laws and
4.

See, e.g., Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 402-403, 414

(1986).
5. Brilmayer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A
Appraisal, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 11.
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suggests reasons why it has played almost no role at all in the debates over
conflict ofjurisdiction. She concludes by suggesting that the fifth amendment
due process clause ought to be viewed as creating some limitation on federal
prescriptive jurisdiction in the international context.
Dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's handling of interstate jurisdictional
and domestic choice of law disputes, Professor Juenger 6 finds no solace in
Professor Brilmayer's suggestion that more attention ought to be paid to the
due process clause. He finds conflict of jurisdiction inevitable, given the
overlapping principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, expansive exercise by
legislatures of prescriptive jurisdiction, and the difficulty of judicial
application of principles of comity or reasonableness. The solution, he
argues, lies not in the judicial branch, but in the legislative and executive
branches of the government. Their tools include softer approaches, such as
exchange of information, consultation, issuance of guidelines for application
of substantive laws, and efforts toward the convergence of substantive
policies.
Dr. Meessen, a special consultant on international economic law for the
Restatement (Revised) on Foreign Relations Law, presents interesting
observations about the jurisdictional principles adopted in Part IV of the
Restatement. 7 He begins by noting that the American Law Institute could not
have attempted to investigate state practice in every field of law where
conflicts of jurisdiction have arisen. Lacking this empirical basis, the
jurisdictional rules must remain somewhat hypothetical and tentative. He,
like many others during the debates at the American Law Institute
proceedings, 8 questions the helpfulness of the tripartite division of
jurisdiction among prescription, adjudication, and enforcement.
As Dr. Meessen observes, the delineation of connecting factors in section
402, such as territoriality and nationality, permitting a state to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction, is quite broad. The reasonableness principle in
section 403, stated as a rule of international law, is intended to serve as an
additional part of the prescriptive jurisdictional test to delimit the scope of
section 402. He finds that this principle of reasonableness lacks rigor and that
reasonableness under this principle will inevitably lack uniformity, meaning,
for example, American or German or French reasonableness when applied in
the United States, Germany, or France, respectively. Nevertheless, because
the reasonableness principle has been stated as a rule of international law, it
does provide the basis for international law remedies.
Finally, he observes that the American Law Institute provided in section
403(3) that where more than one state has a reasonable basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction, and their prescriptions conflict, each state must, under
6. Juenger. ConstitulionaI Control of Extrterritoriality: .4 Comment on Professoi Brilmyer Apprisal.
.
LA.'W & CONTEMI'. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 39.
7. Meessen, Conflicts ofjurisdicio, n'der the .Vew Restatemen,. L..,w & CONTEMP. PROBS., Stimmer
1987, at 47.
8. See 59 A.L.I. Proc. 220-58, 286-89 (1983).
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international law, balance its interest in exercising jurisdiction against those
interests of the conflicting jurisdiction; however, section 403(3) concludes
with the "soft" law directive that the state with the lesser interest "should"
defer to the state with the greater interest. Dr. Meessen reiterates his earlier
conclusion 9 that, at least in the field of antitrust law, the process of both
balancing interests and deferring to the state with the greater interests is
supported by state practice. For other fields, the black-letter text suggesting
deferral remains an hypothesis without greater evidence of state practice but,
Dr. Meessen observes, it is headed in the right direction. Because of the
shortcomings of jurisdictional rules applied by national courts, Dr. Meessen
urges development of both treaty law and international adjudication of
jurisdictional conflicts.
Probably the most contentious exercise ofjurisdiction by the United States
has been its claim to regulate foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations.
Dr. Meessen notes that European nations will criticize section 414 of the
revised Restatement for approving some jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries. Although Dr. Meessen finds section 414 replete with phrases
connoting unease-such as "not ordinarily," "limited jurisdiction," and
"exceptional cases"-a student noteit concludes that the narrow basis for
jurisdiction outlined in section 414 is a prudent and workable compromise
between the unreconcilable claims of absolutely no jurisdiction (because the
subsidiary is a creature of the local jurisdiction) and extensive jurisdiction
(because the subsidiary is a part of a single international economic
enterprise).
As prescribed in Professor Wood's comment," one approach to
jurisdictional conflict resolution is the consequential approach: An
administrator or a court waits to see whether the existence of a U.S.
prescriptive rule in conflict with that of another jurisdiction will as a practical
matter cause an actual conflict. She notes that enforcement jurisdiction
clashes are typically resolved by U.S. courts in this consequential way,
particularly in the context of refusals to comply with U.S. discovery requests.
A student note12 extensively evaluates the methodology employed by U.S.
courts to determine when production should be ordered in cases involving
conflict between U.S. discovery rules and foreign blocking statutes.
Observing what judges actually do, rather than what they say they are doing

when employing the balancing-of-interest method of conflict resolution, this
note proposes the following methodology for resolving discovery conflicts: A
court should issue an order for discovery upon a finding that the requested
information is directly relevant and upon a further finding of any one of the
following: (1) that the case involves public rather than private law; (2) that the
9. Meessen,.,intitustJrisdiction under Castomor , IternationalLaw, 78 AM.J. INT'i. L. 783 (1984).
10. Note, Extraterritorial Subsidiary jrisdiction, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 71.
I I. Wood, Conflicts of Jinisdiction on Antitrust Law .4 Cornment on Ordover and Atwood, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 179.
12. Note, Beyond the Rhetoric of Cooipaiative Interest Balancing: An .Altrntive
Approach to
Extraten itorial Discover , Conflicts, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 1987, at 95.
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blocking statute is not an actual barrier to production; or (3) that no
reasonable good faith effort to produce the documents was made. In
particular, factors (2) and (3) of this methodology emphasize the
consequential approach noted by Professor Wood. Moreover, the first factor,
that the case involves public law, gives explicit recognition to the fact that
judges typically find that U.S. interests evidenced by public laws compel the
court to order the production. Importantly, this note supports critics of the
balancing-of-interest approach to conflicts resolution, who observe that this
approach provides no judicially manageable standards for assigning weight to
competing foreign interests.
SPECIFIC ECONOMIC REGULATORY LAWS

As is often the case, when jurisdictional principles based on connecting
factors and reasonableness are actually applied to substantive areas, they
prove inadequate to their task. Nowhere is this clearer than in the area of
export controls. Professor Abbott' 3 convincingly illustrates why the
positivistic approach to the problems posed by extraterritorial trade controls
has failed: Sections 402 and 403 of the revised Restatement invoke rules that
are by no means clear, that are unlikely to receive an authoritative
interpretation, and that are by no means unanimously accepted as binding;
moreover, they do not help us to understand the sources of the dispute or of
its unusual intensity or to think about ways of actually resolving it.
Accordingly, Professor Abbott rejects this positivistic approach and applies
that of modern international relations theory to identify the structural
problems of the international system which are the sources of the dispute. He
identifies one structural problem as the achievement of the necessary
international cooperation among self-interested states in the production of
collective goods. Cooperation is particularly difficult to achieve because the
United States sees itself as the leader in producing essential international
collective goods (for example, weakening the Soviet Union or deterring
aggression or terrorism) through its export control laws and views its goals
weakened by the free-riding of its allies. Europe, however, often expresses
preferences for collective goods different from, and sometimes opposed to,
those of the United States.
Professor Abbott identifies the second structural problem as the gap
between the way we define the state-statically-and the highly mobile nature
of the state's resources. The United States has tried to bridge this gap by
asserting, through its export control laws, a limited right to control certain
resources that are functionally associated with it, even though they are
physically outside its boundaries. Professor Abbott summarizes that in both
its control over foreign subsidiaries and reexport of goods and technology,
the United States is claiming what it sees as a right of unilateral action to
13. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial Trade Corols. Lxw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1987, at 117.
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control resources functionally associated with it for the production of certain
international collective goods, where cooperation is difficult to achieve, and
free-riding is evident. Seen in this light, Professor Abbott makes some
favorable observations about the U.S. position on extraterritorial trade
controls and derives a thoughtful summary of reasonable limitations on these
controls, which he urges ought to be pursued through negotiation by the
United States Government.
Although Dr. Meessen has argued that state practice in the field of
antitrust provides support for both the principle of reasonableness and the
14
balancing of interests contained in section 403 of the revised Restatement,
writers in this symposium would like to proceed beyond these general rules to
more specific substantive rules addressing the problem of extraterritoriality in
the field of antitrust. Mr. Atwood 15 takes one example, that of the export
cartel, and shows how such cartels still defy clear regulatory answers under
substantive antitrust rules. Although he does not argue for more extensive
use of export cartels as a trade policy, he does argue, pragmatically, that
because each nation tolerates its own export cartels (accepting the view that it
ought to optimize the terms of its export trade, and not simply optimize the
volume of its export trade), antitrust policy should be modified to eliminate
regulation of the export cartels of other countries if: (1) the export cartel is
national rather than international; (2) the cartel is publicly registered under
some statutory program; and (3) the cartel's collaborative behavior is strictly
confined to its own national territory.
Dr. Ordover"' broadly summarizes the extent to which U.S. antitrust
policy should tolerate the external effects of industrial policies (including
export cartels) followed by other nations. In general, Dr. Ordover argues that
when a nation's industrial policy is designed to cure market failure or to
pursue some socioeconomic objective (for example, enhancement of research
and development), the United States should yield primacy to these policies.
When the industrial policy is designed, however, to transfer firms' profits or
consumer surplus from abroad to the regulating country, then the United
States should not yield to these policies. In applying this general approach,
he reaches several interesting conclusions: (1) when considering potential
violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is most plausible to assume that
all firms, including those which are under the control of foreign governments,
behave as profit-maximizing entities; (2) only a limited foreign sovereign
compulsion defense should be available to foreign cartels comprised of nongovernment entities, which may foreseeablv and significantly elevate prices in
the United States; (3) economic theory suggests (i) the abolition of the foreign
sovereign compulsion defense for cartels constituting government-controlled
14.
15.

Mcesscn, supra note 9.
At wood, Coi/icits of jurispruden'e i the .A n/it us/ Field: The EI:(m(ph" Of l'Xpo t Cam/elm. L.Aw &
CON'rEII'. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 153.
16. Ordovcr. Co;/licts of Jmiisdir/ion." .1mm/i/inst/(1d hmmdstrial Policy. lw
AN) CONTrI,'w. PROBS.,
Summer 1987, at 165.
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entities, and (ii) that sovereign immunity should be viewed narrowly under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, treating sovereign acts as primarily commercial
in nature, since the type of conduct reached by section 1 cannot be justified as
legitimate industrial policy; and (4) the balancing test is likely to remain
largely unworkable until viewpoints converge among nations concerning the
legitimate use of industrial policies. In his second conclusion, Dr. Ordover
disagrees with Mr. Atwood's proposal concerning export cartels.
Professor Wood's comment' 7 critiques the suggestions by both Mr.
Atwood and Professor Ordover. She finds Mr. Atwood's suggestion too
mechanistic, unsupported by any economic justification, and inconsistent with
the congressional policy indicated in the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982, to permit each importing country to regulate
export cartels having significant economic effects within its jurisdiction. She
finds Ordover's approach particularly interesting, since he persuasively argues
that the welfare effects and externalities of different kinds of industrial
policies will vary, and that the regulating country's legitimate interests in
overriding these policies should vary depending upon what the particular
industrial policy is trying to accomplish. She concludes, however, that Dr.
Ordover's policy approach is unworkable in practice because it is difficult to
determine in many cases the motivations behind specific industrial policies;
and because it is sufficiently inconsistent with the understanding of the
foreign sovereign compulsion defense, it would lead to greater tensions
between competing nations than the present system of conflict resolution.
Professors Tower and Willett's comment' emphasizes the problem of
implementing adequate enforcement remedies in international antitrust cases.
In particular, they note the difficulty in countering prices that are too high
because of anticompetitive behavior outside the United States. For example,
forbidding the import of products produced by a foreign export cartel may
only add to the costs of the U.S. economy of the original restrictions in
supply. The best response may be to do nothing, to bribe or to threaten
retaliation, or some combination of the latter two, in order to induce changes
in the behavior abroad. They conclude that the best avenue for achieving
competition goals in international commerce is government-to-government
negotiation. They consider Professor Abbott's analysis of extraterritorial
trade controls an excellent illustration of the need to consider seriously
enforcement issues (recalling that Europe ultimately proved that it had the
physical power to prevent the enforcement of U.S. export control laws) and to
construct sensible criteria for negotiating government-to-government
agreement on the reach of such controls.

17.
18.

Wood, supra note 1I.
Tower & Willett, Enforceabiliiv and the Resolution of InternationalJuoisdictional Conflicts: Copinnents
on Abboti, Atwood, and Ordover LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 189.
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A student note 9 lends support to Professors Tower, Willett, and Abbott's
conclusions about the limits on effective unilateral action and the necessity for
the government to manage extraterritorial conflicts and to seek negotiated
resolutions. It describes the manner in which unilateral self-help through the
enactment of blocking statutes has not only heightened conflicts, but has
often hampered the antitrust defense of the blocking country's own nationals.
It also critiques suggested unilateral measures that might be taken by the
United States, such as legislative enactment of the principle of reasonableness
and balancing of interests contained in section 403(2) and (3) of the revised
Restatement, and the elimination of treble damages in certain international
antitrust actions. The note suggests that such unilateral actions are unlikely
to coax U.S. allies into repealing their blocking statutes.
One of the more interesting activities to observe in the next several years
will be the reaction of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and similar regulators in other markets, to the internationalization of
the securities markets. Professor Austin from Australia, 20 and Mr. Connelly
from Canada, 2 1 make interesting observations about what considerations the
SEC should take into account in regulating foreign issuers in the U.S. market,
U.S. issuers in foreign markets, and multi-jurisdictional, or simultaneous,
securities offerings. Professor Austin notes first that internationalization itself
is not a phenomenon to be regulated. Rather, it creates new issues to be
considered in the context of the usual questions to be considered by the SEC:
Market efficiency and investor confidence and protection in the United States.
Both writers explore questions relating to foreign issuers operating in U.S.
markets. Professor Austin examines the proposition that foreign issuers
ought to be subject to less strenuous requirements than U.S. issuers. He
concludes that, against the backdrop of the usual issues addressed by the SEC,
this question of different treatment is the incorrect one. Rather, the correct
question is whether certain ingredients of current U.S. domestic disclosure
policies are necessary for U.S. investor protection, whether applied to foreign
or U.S. issuers. Both writers address the continuous disclosure requirements
imposed by the SEC on issuers of securities in the U.S. markets. The distinct
disclosure requirements of the SEC, along with U.S. civil liability provisions
for material misstatements, present substantial barriers to entry into the U.S.
market.
Professor Austin also addresses to what extent the SEC should administer
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act to reach offers and sales of the
securities of U.S. issuers in foreign capital markets. He critiques the SEC's
administrative position that the 1933 Act will not apply where the offering is
made under circumstances reasonably designed to preclude distribution or
19.

Note, Reassesswent of hnternationalApplication of Antitrnst Laws: Blocking Statites, Balancing Tests,

and Treble Damages, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 197.
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Securities Markets, L.AW & CONTEMP. PROBS.. Summer 1987, at 221.
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redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United States
(often referred to as the "coming to rest abroad" principle). He suggests that
the SEC should follow a more balanced approach whereby U.S. investors are
permitted to purchase securities offered by U.S. issuers in other wellregulated foreign capital markets.
MANAGEMENT OF STATE PRACTICE

Several of the articles in this symposium possess a common theme:
Theoretical or methodological or black-letter statements of principles of
jurisdiction advance somewhat the issues posed by extraterritoriality, but
often they are beside the point. If this theme is not yet clear to the reader, it
ought to become clear by observing the comments made by the writers in the
last two papers of this symposium. Dr. Hoechner's article 2 2 presents a Swiss
perspective on conflicts of jurisdiction, which he demonstrates is quite
different from that of the United States Government. Dr. Hoechner largely
attributes the differences not only to disagreement about black-letter
principles of prescriptive jurisdiction under international law, but more
importantly to differences in the legal systems of the two countries. Some of
these differences include the manner by which U.S. courts obtain long-arm
jurisdiction over foreign persons, their substantive damages awards, their
extensive discovery procedures and, separately, the extensive activities of U.S.
regulatory agencies.
The discussions by Dr. Hoechner and by Mr. Small of the United States
Department of State,2 3 embellished by the more specific subject matter
discussions of the preceding articles, illustrate that the gaps in the theoretical
debate, the legal systems of the allies, and the substantive policies are so
substantial that progress may now be best achieved by emphasizing the
management role of governments. Dr. Hoechner provides a useful summary
of ways by which the Swiss and U.S. governments have recently managed
enforcement problems in the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. Mr.
Small provides a complete overview of the management approaches of the
Executive Branch, led by the State Department, in every area of
extraterritoriality conflict.
Because of the United States Government's heightened awareness of the
need to manage and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, the intensity and
emotionalism of the debate have lessened. None of these articles suggests,
however, that we have made much progress in eliminating the sources of the
conflicts. To the contrary, as observed particularly by Professor Abbott and
Mr. Small, the continuing existence of the sources of our extraterritoriality
conflicts is inevitable. Some might venture to suggest that these conflicts will
become an even broader problem as international economic relations become
22. Hoechner, 1 Swiss Perspertive on Conflicts ofJurisdiction, LA.W & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1987, at 311.
23. Small, .1anaging EtlrateritorialJuisdictionProblems: The 'nited Stales Goveinment Approach. LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 283.
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predictably more intertwined. Governments ought, then, in the meantime, to
take advantage of this calmer period to heed the suggestions of writers in this
symposium for improving policies reflected in economic regulatory laws, and
for converging these policies through international negotiations.

